Recently, the Web Services Interoperability Organization (WS-I) has announced to have completed its interoperability standards work. The latest deliverables include the so-called "Basic Security Profile" and the "Reliable Secure Profile". This gives rise to the question whether or not Web Services adopters can rely on interoperability and functionality of Web Services stacks, in particular in terms of security and reliability features. To answer this question, we thoroughly analyze two important Web Services stacks for interoperability of WS-Security and WSReliableMessaging features. Our analysis shows that security and reliability features are far from being implemented in an interoperable manner. Additionally, we reveal that some of those interoperability problems are not even covered by WS-I profiles and therefore conclude that WS-I's work has not yet resulted in Web Services interoperability. Finally, we investigate support for the so-called "Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario" in order to find out whether WS-* adopters can at least rely on the availability of real-world functionality in homogeneous environments.
INTRODUCTION
Quality-of-Service (QoS) features such as security and reliability are brought to the Web Services world by the so-called WS-* standards. WS-Security 1.1 (WS-Sec, OASIS 2006) and WSReliableMessaging 1.2 (WS-RM, OASIS 2009a) are prominent representatives of WS-* standards that define data formats and processing instructions for extending the SOAP (W3C 2007) messages that implement Web Services exchanges. For example, an XML Signature tag together with SignedInfo, SignatureValue and KeyInfo tags would have to be inserted into the SOAP Header tag to provide integrity protection. For convenience, a Web Services developer is not supposed to 'manually' insert all that information into SOAP messages. Instead, Web Services Security Policy 1.3 (WS-Sec-Pol, OASIS 2009b) and Web Services Reliable Messaging Policy Assertion 1.2 (WS-RM-Pol, OASIS 2009c) can be used to extend the WSDL definition of a Web service with assertions that instruct the Web Services stack implementations (WS stack in the following) in use to apply WS-Sec and WS-RM features to the SOAP message exchanges. This policy-based realization of QoS features for Web Services has been postulated in several publications (Martino and Bertino 2009; Gruschka, Luttenberger et al. 2006; Gruschka, Jensen et al. 2007; Curbera, Khalaf et al. 2008; Khalaf, Keller et al. 2006; Nezhad, Benatallah et al. 2006; Menzel, Warschofsky et al. 2010a ) and promises better interoperability than letting all Web Services developers implement QoS features their own way.
On November 10th 2010, the Web Services Interoperability Organization (WS-I) released a press announcement with the following title:
"WS-I Completes Web Services Interoperability Standards Work Industry Collaboration Enables Interoperability in the Cloud" 1 This announcement followed the release of new versions of WS-I's core deliverables, most notably the Basic Security Profile (BSP, WS-I 2010a) and Reliable Secure Profile (RSP, WS-I 2010b) in 2010. WS-I profiles are the core deliverables of WS-I and document " [..] clarifications, refinements, interpretations and amplifications of those specifications which promote interoperability" (WS-I 2010b) . The main target of BSP and RSP are WS-Sec and WS-RM. As WS-I promotes interoperability and has declared its standardization work to be completed, this means that Web Services adopters should be able to rely on the interoperable implementation of Web Services security and reliability features which are pivotal for Web Services according to (Nezhad, Benatallah et al. 2006; Moser, Melliar-Smith et al. 2007 ). However, WS-Sec and WS-RM as well as WS-Sec-Pol and WS-RM-Pol are highly complex specifications so that interoperability across WS stacks does not come easy. Consistently, (Martino and Bertino 2009) 
stress that "although one of the main purposes of the standard [i.e., a WS security standard] is to guarantee the interoperability between different platforms, it might be necessary to test it on the field."
This paper investigates in how far WS-I's work has led to interoperability across WS stacks regarding the implementation of WS-Sec(-Pol) and WS-RM(-Pol) and whether real-world functionality is available. In order to operationalize the question whether or not a Web Services adopter can rely on interoperability between different WS stacks, we use two 'optimistic' hypotheses:
H1: The overwhelming majority of WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol features are implemented by
Web Services stacks.
H2: Out of those WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol features implemented by two platforms, the overwhelming majority is implemented in an interoperable manner.
For analyzing availability of real-world functionality, support of the so-called Secure WSReliableMessaging Scenario (SecRM scenario, Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005; Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006 ) is investigated. The SecRM scenario describes the WS-Sec and WS-RM based implementation of important security and reliability properties that have been identified as crucial for integration scenarios and therefore provides a good benchmark for real-world functionality. In anticipation of the interoperability results of section INTEROPERABILITY ASSESSMENT, the SecRM scenario is tested in homogeneous environments only.
This paper is an extended version of (Schönberger, Schwalb et al. 2011 ) and the main new content is the analysis of the SecRM scenario presented in section FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENT. The contribution described in this paper is fourfold where the first three contributions originally have been published in (Schönberger, Schwalb et al. 2011) . First, we assess the coverage of WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol specifications by two major Java-based WS stacks. Second, we assess the interoperability of implemented features. Based on these results, both hypotheses (H1, H2) will have to be rejected. Third, we analyze in how far the detected interoperability issues could have been avoided by strict compliance to the BSP and RSP. Fourth, we present a WS-Policy operationalization of the SecRM scenario and we show that this advanced real-world WS-* functionality is available at least for one platform.
In section TEST APPROACH, the notion of interoperability is operationalized for the work at hand and the approach towards interoperability testing WS-* standards is described. Section 
INTEROPERABILITY ASSESSMENT

TEST APPROACH
In order to provide a sound foundation for this work, we sketch our approach for testing WS-* interoperability by operationalizing the notion of interoperability, describing a concept for executing test cases and outlining the systematic derivation of test cases. (Wegner 1996) defines 'interoperability' as the "the ability of two or more software components to cooperate despite differences in language, interface, and execution platform." While this definition is good enough for an abstract characterization of interoperability in arbitrary systems, it has to be refined for the purpose of WS-* interoperability testing. Remember that we require the use of WS-Policy for asserting QoS properties of Web Services interactions. Hence, the following sources of interoperability issues between two WS stacks have to be considered. First, one of the WS stacks under test may not know/refuse a particular WS-Policy assertion that specifies a particular communication feature. Second, one of the WS stacks may accept a WSPolicy assertion, but ignore it. Third, a WS stack may deviate from one or more of the processing instructions that are specified by a WS-* standard for the implementation of a particular WSPolicy assertion. Considering these sources of interoperability issues and taking into account that a Web service interaction typically takes place between a client role and a server role, 12 interoperability levels can be identified that range from a policy being refused/ignored by one of the roles over abrupt termination of communication to full protocol success (for details, please see . So, for the purpose of this work, interoperability is defined as follows: For determining interoperability as defined above, the approach visualized in Figure 1 is applied. WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol definitions are used to specify concrete test cases. For each test case, the WSDL of a sample Web service is extended with such a definition to be used by the WS stacks of the Web service client and provider for determining the number, sequence and contents of the SOAP messages to be exchanged (upper part of Figure 1 ). The test case is then performed for four different WS stack configurations. Assume that two WS stacks A and B are to be tested for interoperability and that a configuration 'X-Y' expresses that WS stack X takes the client role and WS stack Y takes the server role. Then, the test case is first performed in homogeneous environments (A-A, B-B) for checking whether or not the functionality is implemented and afterwards in heterogeneous environments (A-B, B-A) for checking interoperability. Note that if only one of the homogeneous environments does not work, then the heterogeneous environments still are worth testing. Our practical tests show (cf. that some features do not work in a homogeneous environment (A-A or B-B), but in a heterogeneous one (B-A or A-B).
Figure 1: Setup of Test Environment
The interoperability levels are to be examined for each test case and WS stack configuration. Some of the interoperability levels can be verified without investigating the SOAP messages exchanged, e.g., refusal of the policy by the server. The analysis and determination of other interoperability levels require the use of network analysis tools like Wireshark 2 that enable capturing the SOAP messages exchanged (lower part of Figure 1 ). However, we do not check the strict conformance of SOAP messages to WS-* standards in our interoperability testing approach. Instead, SOAP messages are only analyzed for the existence of WS-* headers as well as for unexpected errors and premature termination. Not checking conformance allows for the possibility of 'interoperable' communication that violates WS-* standards. Consistently, definition 1 deliberately does not require that WS-* processing rules are applied correctly. From our experience, this is a purely theoretical limitation for heterogeneous environments.
For deriving the configuration options for a single policy assertion, we propose to make use of the assertion structure definitions that are published in the WS-Policy extension standards. Listing 1 shows the structure definition of the WS-RM-Pol standard's RMAssertion assertion (note that usual regular expression operators are used to define structural constraints on the assertion). This assertion basically says that delivery semantics options ExactlyOnce, AtLeastOnce and AtMostOnce of WS-RM must be combined with either InOrder delivery or not. Checking these features in isolation frequently is not possible because a deployable WS-Policy configuration may require additional assertions, e.g., testing a WS-Sec-Pol protection assertion requires declaring assertions for a valid security binding (options for so-called Asymmetric-/Symmetric-/TransportBindings). To solve this issue, we propose to start with sample policy configurations that ship with WS stacks or are retrievable from the web and then to permute the options of the assertion under test only. By using the WS-Policy structure definitions and sample policy configurations as proposed, it is possible to identify test cases that test a WS-* feature almost in isolation and to achieve reasonable coverage of the WS-Policy standards. Based on the results of these "isolated" test cases, "combined" test cases that cover the interplay of several WS-* features can be derived. 
.1). 7) Deviating Signing Strategy for Timestamp
The optional WS-Sec-Pol IncludeTimestamp element (OASIS 2009b, section 7.3, 7.4, 7.5) can be used to require the inclusion of a Timestamp element in the SOAP headers of an interaction and is supported by both platforms. Additionally, WS-Sec-Pol requires that if IncludeTimestamp is specified and if there is no transport layer encryption specified then the Timestamp has to be integrity protected at the message level, i.e., signed (OASIS 2009b, section 6.2). However, platform A does not directly implement this rule but requires the Web Services developer to add an according SignedElements/XPath expression to sign the timestamp.
8) Ignored IncludeToken Values
The optional attribute IncludeToken allows for specifying in which SOAP messages of an interaction a corresponding token, e.g., a UsernameToken, should be present. 
Overall Results
Due to space limitations, we only present the most interesting figures of the interoperability tests. The interoperability levels detected for all test cases are available as a technical report . In Table 1 , the column headers provide the following information: a) # counts the number of test cases per test group b) A-A (B-B) counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected with platform A (B) as both, client and server. c) A-A ∧ B-B counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected for both homogeneous environments. d) A-A ∨ B-B counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected for at least one of the homogeneous environments. e) A-B ∨ B-A counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected for at least one of the heterogeneous environments. f) A-B ∧ B-A counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected for both homogeneous environments. g) (A-A ∧ B-B) ∧ ¬(A-B ∧ B-A) counts the number of test cases per test group for which full interoperability could be detected for both homogeneous environments, but where an interoperability problem was detected for at least one of the heterogeneous environments.
In turn, the row headers simple distinguish the different test groups. The overall figures reveal that platform A implements only 30.2% (51 test cases) and platform B only 58.6% (99 test cases) of the WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol functionality. Based on this data, hypothesis H1 must be rejected.
Luckily, the functionalities implemented by the two platforms largely overlap which can be inferred by observing that (A-A ∧ B-B) is close to Min(A-A,B-B) for all test groups. Therefore, there are at least 41 test cases that could be performed successfully on both homogeneous platforms which allows for testing hypothesis H2. Out of those 41 test cases there were 13 (31.7%) test cases that could not be performed successfully in both heterogeneous environments. Considering the complexity of WS-RM-Pol and especially WS-Sec-Pol this number does not seem to be too high, but for practical purposes an error rate of about one third is not acceptable and therefore H2 must be rejected as well. Taking the effects of low coverage and bad interoperability together results in very low WS-SecPol/WS-RM-Pol functionality that is supported in an interoperable manner. Only 47 (27.8%) out of 169 test cases can be performed successfully in at least one of the heterogeneous environments and only 28 (16.6%) test cases for both heterogeneous environments. This means that implementing security and reliability for Web Services based on WS-RM-Pol and WS-Sec-Pol for the heterogeneous platform configurations investigated here is at least a challenge. In particular, it is not possible to exchange a SOAP message between the two platforms that is both, confidentiality and integrity protected. Platform B does not support XPath for identifying the elements to be encrypted. Instead, it relies on using the EncryptedParts assertion and assumes an InlcudeToken value of Never for using X509 tokens (which is the only basic token type supported for the heterogeneous environments). Platform A ignores any IncludeToken value an always inserts the token into the SOAP messages which is then rejected by platform B. Additionally, platform A does not support the TransportBinding assertion so that SSL encryption cannot be asserted either. In consequence, deriving combined test cases from isolated test cases (cf. section TEST APPROACH) essentially is senseless.
At least, there is an integrity and confidentiality protected interaction that comes close to WSSec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol based QoS implementation. For confidentiality protection, SSL is used which is configured for platform B using a standard TransportBinding assertion and for platform A using proprietary configuration. For integrity protection, an AsymmetricBinding together with an X509Token is specified and the elements to be signed are identified using the SignedParts assertion. However, apart from not being fully standards based, only using platform A as server and platform B as client can be performed successfully because the other way round a platform A client tries to retrieve proprietary configuration information in vain.
WS-I TO THE RESCUE?
The two main deliverables of the WS-I that cover the application of WS-Sec and WS-RM are the A common characteristic of those requirements is that they define constraints on the level of SOAP messages, i.e., the existence, order and content of XML elements within SOAP messages or the actual exchange of SOAP messages is described. Consequently, the WS-I testing tools take SOAP messages as input and check them for compliance to the BSP and RSP requirements. From the perspective of facilitating interoperability, this amounts to replacing actual interoperability testing as described in section TEST APPROACH by checking standard compliance of SOAP messages. However, checking standard compliance itself is subject to errors and therefore merely an add-on to true interoperability testing but not a replacement. Even worse, the relation between WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol assertions and the corresponding SOAP messages exchanged is not described in BSP and RSP at all. In section 5.1.1, the BSP explicitly allows for out of band agreement for specifying the use of WS-Sec. Moreover, it states in several sections (9, 10, 13. In so far, the interoperability issues 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of section Core Interoperability Issues are not covered by the BSP/RSP at all. For issue 1 (no WS-RM-Pol support), platform A can be considered to ignore a WS-I recommendation. But as the RSP does not explicitly require the use of WS-RM-Pol, platform A nonetheless cannot be said to violate the RSP. For issue 5 (no EncryptBeforeSigning support), the BSP explicitly states in its section 6.1 ('Processing Order'), that both, encryption before signing as well as signing before encryption, may be appropriate depending on the application scenario. In so far, both protection orders must be supported by a WS-I compliant stack. However, that actually has got nothing to do with supporting the WS-Sec-Pol EncryptBeforeSigning assertion. As the BSP explicitly allows for out of band agreement for specifying the use of WS-Sec, not supporting EncryptBeforeSigning can be considered to be WS-I compliant. Finally, for issue 9 (deviating Processing of SignedParts/Body), the BSP states in its section 19.4 that "it is RECOMMENDED that applications signing any part of the SOAP body sign the entire body."
However, the WS-Sec-Pol specification is absolutely clear about this point itself (cf. OASIS 2009b, section 4.1.1).
All in all, none of the core interoperability problems detected is due to violating WS-I profiles. Only 1 issue out of 10 is reinforced by the BSP. This, taken together with the test results of the previous section, seems to imply that the approach of replacing true interoperability testing by WS-I compliance checking and neglecting the relation between WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol assertions and SOAP messages is not sufficient for ensuring interoperability between WS stacks. Note that WS-I does not question the use of WS-Policy standards. The RSP recommends using WS-RM-Pol, the BSP states that "strict policy specification and enforcement regarding which message parts are to be signed" (WS-I 2010a, section 19.4) is a countermeasure against attacks, and the so-called delivery package of the RSP ships with a few WS-Policy definitions (though without defining the effect on SOAP messages in detail). However, it leaves out a detailed treatment of WS-RM-Pol and WS-Sec-Pol.
FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENT
The content presented so far demonstrates that interoperable implementation of WS-* functionality according to definition 1 cannot be expected and that current WS stack implementations do not cover considerable parts of WS-RM-Pol and WS-Sec-Pol functionality. This information does not reveal in how far real-world scenarios of WS-* functionality can be implemented using today's stacks. Even if interoperable WS-* functionality is not available there are use cases of WS-RM and WS-Sec that are desirable for homogeneous environments as well. Content-level encryption and signing of XML messages allows for multi-party scenarios that barely can be matched using transport level security methods. The combination with additional WS-* standards such as WS-Trust (OASIS 2009d) and WS-SecureConversation (OASIS 2009e) allows integration scenarios that obviate the need of mutual security certificate exchanges outside the actual Web Services interaction. In order to assess the accessibility of advanced WS-* functionality, we review the implementability of the so-called Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario (SecRM scenario) as a benchmark for the two WS stacks under test of this work. This scenario resulted from the interaction of major Web Services vendors who conceived it as real world use case for Web Services interaction (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) . Additionally, this scenario has formally been validated by two independent research groups (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006; Bhargavan, Corin et al. 2007 ) and the analyzed properties such as mutual authentication have been identified as essential for Web Services-based Business-to-Business integration (B2Bi) .
The purpose of the SecRM scenario is the reliable exchange of confidential, authenticated and integrity-protected messages without frequent key exchanges (cf. Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006; Bhargavan, Corin et al. 2007 , for more detailed descriptions of security properties). In order to achieve these goals WS-Sec, WS-RM, WS-Trust, WS-SecureConversation as well as WSAddressing are combined for establishing a WS-SecureConversation session (or security context) which is then used to reliably and securely exchange messages. Basically, the SecRM scenario consists of a key-exchange phase, a message sending phase and a termination phase (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006 ). The key-exchange phase generates a so-called Security Context Token (SCT) and uses asymmetric keys for integrity as well as confidentiality protection of WSSecureConversation bootstrap messages. After the generation of the security context, a WS-RM sequence is initiated which is used for exchanging payload messages. Once the exchange of all payload-messages has been acknowledged, the WS-RM sequence as well as the security context are subsequently terminated.
The steps listed below describe the interactions between client and sender role of the SecRM scenario and reflect the definitions of (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006 ) and (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005 , pages 34-60). The prefixes wsrm, wss, wst, wsu and env are used to identify concepts of the WS-RM, WS-Sec, WS-Trust, WS-Sec utility and SOAP standards, respectively.
1) RequestSecurityToken RST
The client sends a message containing a RST to the service, asking the service to issue a SCT. This message must be signed and encrypted by the client using the service's public key.
2) RequestSecurityTokenResponse RSTR
The service responds with a RSTR message, containing the requested SCT. This message must be signed and encrypted by the service using the client's public key. The SCT must be used for signing and encrypting any message of the subsequent message flow.
3) CreateSequence
The client sends a wsrm:CreateSequence message to the service. This message includes a wss:SecurityContextReference to reference the SCT received in step 2. This SCT is used to sign the wsrm:CreateSequence message and encrypt the wss:Signature.
4) CreateSequenceResponse
The service responds to the CreateSequence request with a wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse message. This message is also signed and the wss:Signature is encrypted using the SCT.
5) Payload Message
The client now sends signed and encrypted messages containing the payload of this communication. Each payload message contains a WS-ReliableMessaging sequence header containing at least the sequence identifier and the sequence number of the according message. In contrast to the previous two and following five messages, the payload messages have an encrypted env:Body.
6) SequenceAcknowledgement
The service acknowledges the receipt of the payload message(s) with a wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement. The scenario definition proposes a single wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement message with an empty env:Body. The acknowledgment headers are also signed and the wss:Signature is encrypted.
7) TerminateSequence
As soon as the client has received the acknowledgments for each message within the message sequence, it closes this sequence using the wsrm:TerminateSequence message defined by WS-RM. This message is signed and the wss:Signature is encrypted, too.
8) TerminateSequenceResponse
The service confirms the termination of the sequence with a signed wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponse message. The wss:Signature of this message is encrypted.
9) CancelSecurityToken
After termination of the WS-ReliableMessaging sequence, the client asks the service for cancellation of the WS-SecureConversation context using a wst:CancelTarget message. The WS-Addressing header elements, the wss:Signature, and the wsu:Timestamp are integrity protected. Additionally, the signature is encrypted whereas the message env:Body is not protected.
10) CancelSecurityTokenResponse
The service confirms the wst:CancelTarget with a wst:RequestedToken Cancelled message. This message is protected in the same way as the wst:CancelTarget message.
Once the security context is started, sender and receiver may create multiple WS-RM sessions for message transmission as the publications do not impose any restrictions on that. However, in order to fulfill the requirements of the SecRM scenario each WS-RM session that is started within the WS-SecureConversation security context must be closed or terminated within the same context. After the security context is established, all signature and encryption processes are performed using keys derived from the SCT. The last two messages, canceling the security context, are protected using SCT-derived keys, too.
Note that (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) and ( Table 2 lists the requirements of the scenario definitions for confidentiality and integrity protection. The corresponding message type number is put in the first column. The other columns show the key required for encrypting (enc) or signing (sig) the message elements wss:Signature (Sign), env:Body, wsu:Timestamp (TS), WS-Addressing headers (WS-A), WS-ReliableMessaging headers (WS-R), and wss:EncryptedKey (EncKey). The entry SK X stands for a session key, which is usually encrypted using the receivers public key (PuK Y ). The private key of a party is abbreviated PrK Y . If a wsc:SecurityContextToken is used to derive keys, these keys are labeled as DK YX . The indices X and Y are variables that are substituted in the table. Instead of the X a number is inserted to identify different instances of the corresponding key type. These instances are independent of the type of party. The index Y determines whether the client (C) or the service (S) is the owner of the key, e.g., PrK S denotes that the key used for the specified operation is the private key of the service, while DK C1 stands for a key derived from a SecurityContextToken by the client. Since multiple derived keys may be used in a SOAP message, each derived key has an assigned number, here '1'. The '•' symbol indicates that the corresponding element is present, but not protected, whereas the '•' means that the corresponding element is not present in this message.
The defining sources of the SecRM scenario describe the messages to be exchanged in detail. However, no WS-Policy definitions are given to instruct the WS stacks under test to create the message as intended. Therefore we sketch the policy configuration of the SecRM scenario in section Policy Configuration that has been derived from the scenario descriptions and the sample messages provided in (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) . Section SecRM Scenario Test Results then checks the generated message exchanges by platform A and B following the approach of section TEST APPROACH. 
Policy Configuration
The policy configurations below sketch the platformindependent specification of the service's WSDL definition for the SecRM scenario. In order to deploy these configurations on platform A and B as referred to above some specific assertions have to be defined. For example, XPath-based Encrypted-and SignedElements assertions have to be added to work around platform A's non-compliant handling of EncryptSignature, EncryptBeforeSigning or Timestamp assertions (cf. above). For such details, please see .
The presentation of the WS-Policy definition is split up into four listings where listing 2 shows the security binding and WS-RM configuration for the actual payload messages, listing 3 shows the configuration for setting up the security context, and listings 4 and 5 show the definition of WS-Sec protection assertions for incoming and outgoing SOAP messages, respectively.
The policy for the actual message exchange (listing 2) defines the use of WS-RM (lines 5-7) and WS-Addressing (lines 9-11) as well as the binding for the security context (lines 13-43). The WS-RM assertion activates the use of WS-RM within the security context. Neither (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005 ) nor (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006 ) allow to draw a conclusion about the delivery assurance to be used in the scenario or whether the WS-RM sequence should be bound to a security token using the wsrmp:SequenceSTR assertion. Conversely, the use of WSAddressing is required by both publications. The WS-Addressing assertion enables the use of WS-Addressing message header properties such as wsa:To, wsa:Action, wsa:MessageID, or wsa:RelatesTo for implementing functionality as required by the SecRM scenario definition.
The setup of the security context is denoted in the sp:SymmetricBinding assertion, since the session key is symmetric. A sp:SecureConversationToken is established as protection token. This token is the base for signature and encryption key derivation (sp:RequireDerivedKeys assertion). The sp:BootstrapPolicy is the policy used to obtain the sp:SecureConversationToken from the token issuer (see listing 3 for a specification of this policy). Within the security context the sp:Basic128 algorithm is used for encryption, since (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005 ) and (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006) propose 128-bit cryptography. Considering the sample message structures in (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) , the sp:Layout of the SOAP messages is a sp:Strict layout (see OASIS 2009b, pages 52/53) and a wsu:Timestamp must be included. Both aspects are not explicitly specified in (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006) . A significant difference between the two scenario specifications is the protection order. Whereas (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) state that "signature occurs before encryption" (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005 , page 35) (first sign the body and then encrypt body and signature), (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006) propose to encrypt the message body first, then to sign the corresponding message parts including the env:Body, and finally to encrypt the signature. Since (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006) give a formal cryptographic analysis of this scenario, the sp:EncryptBeforeSigning assertion has been chosen. The sp:EncryptSignature assertion then requires the encryption of the wss:Signature. The sp:BootstrapPolicy defines the policy for the sp:SecureConver sationToken request and the sp:SecureConversationToken issuance. (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005) and (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006 ) stipulate the use of X509 certificates in the sp:BootstrapPolicy, which are certified by a certificate authority. This is important for real-world use cases, however, for the purpose of testing platforms A and B, client and service are in possession of a trusted X509 certificate of each other. This change of the scenario does not have any effect on the policy configuration or the SOAP message traffic between client and service, and is therefore not relevant in this work.
The sp:BootstrapPolicy in listing 3 uses an sp:AsymmetricBinding (public-key cryptography) with a sp:X509Token for the initiator and the recipient. The initiator should send his public key as wss:BinarySecurityToken to the recipient, whereas the key of the recipient must not necessarily be transmitted to the client. The sp:AlgorithmSuite, the sp:Layout, the wsu:Timestamp inclusion, the protection order, and the sp:EncryptSignature instruction are used analogously to the sp:SymmetricBinding of the main policy. In addition to the security binding assertions, the sp:BootstrapPolicy specifies the message elements to be protected. The scenario definition stipulates that the WS-Addressing headers, the wsu:Timestamp, and the message env:Body are to be signed. The assertions in lines 39 and 40 of listing 3 indicate that all WS-Addressing headers must be signed (for reasons of compatibility the XML namespace of two WS-Addressing versions is specified), the assertion in line 41 defines that the env:Body must be signed. The wsu:Timestamp of a SOAP message must always be covered by a signature due to the sp:IncludeTimestamp definition in (OASIS 2009b, page 51) . The encryption of the env:Body is declared in lines 44-46 and the encryption of the signature is asserted with the sp:EncryptSignature element in the binding (line 34 of listing 3).
The protection assertions of the messages from the client to the service (see listing 4) and vice versa (see listing 5) are similar to the assertions defined in the sp:BootstrapPolicy: the WS-Addressing headers and the env:Body are intended for integrity protection, and the env:Body is also encrypted. In addition, the WS-RM header sections are signed.
Listing 4. The WS-SecurityPolicy protection assertions for the input messages 1 <wsp:Policy wsu:Id="SecureRMSessionInput"> 
SecRM Scenario Test Results
This section analyzes the SOAP message traffic produced by platforms A and B for the SecRM scenario by checking for the existence of relevant WS-* elements as defined in Table 2 in the exchanged SOAP messages. The approach taken follows the test approach outlined in section TEST APPROACH which is, roughly speaking, invocation of the service by a QoS-aware client, logging of the SOAP message traffic, and analysis of the captured message trace.
The analysis of the test run on platform B shows a close match to the scenario definitions. Yet, the results obtained slightly deviate from the expected results, since, in general, the wss:Signature is not encrypted if the env:Body is not encrypted on platform B. This concerns message types 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9. Message type 6 contains an encrypted and signed env:Body, although the scenario definitions intend an empty and unprotected env:Body. Although this is a deviation from the scenario definition, the behavior of platform B is standard compliant since the "primary signature element is NOT REQUIRED to be encrypted [...] when there is nothing in the message that is covered by this signature that is encrypted." (OASIS 2009b (OASIS , lines 1730 (OASIS /1731 . Conversely, the env:Body of message type 10 is encrypted, and therefore the wss:Signature also is encrypted.
Interestingly, a platform B client first sends a wsrm:CloseSequence message and then a wsrm:TerminateSequence message to terminate the sequence. The service answers both messages with a corresponding response message. Although this means that platform B's message sequence differs from the scenario description, this is a minor deviation since both message types are protected in exactly the same way and both have the same purpose. Therefore, the four messages are treated as two two-part message types 7 and 8 in the scenario analysis below. Table 3 summarizes the results of the scenario analysis on platform B. It shows the protected message parts and the keys used for protection. The notation conventions correspond to the ones defined for Table 2. Compared to platform B, the results obtained from the test runs on platform A deviate significantly from the scenario definitions. Concerning the message sequence, the fact that neither the WS-RM sequence nor the WS-SecureConversation security context is terminated or canceled is striking. On platform A, sequences or sessions have to be closed explicitly by addressing the WS-RM sequence in the source code of a client application. However, this does not fulfill the call for policy-based implementation of WS-* functionality (cf. section INTRODUCTION) and is therefore considered to be invalid.
However, not only the message sequence does not comply with the SecRM scenario, but also the structure of several messages. The wsu:Timestamp elements have no expiration date, the message env:Body always is encrypted, even when the scenario does not intend a confidentiality protection, and platform A only uses a wss:SecurityTokenReference instead of an embedded wsc:SecurityContextToken. Similar to the results for platform B, message type 6 has an integrity and confidentiality protected env:Body which is not scenario compliant. Table 4 lists the protected parts and gives an overview of the keys used to realize the protection. The notation corresponds to the one of Table 2 and Table 3 . 
RELATED WORK
In SOA research, considerable efforts have been undertaken towards testing QoS, for example (Canfora and Di Penta 2006-2008; Bertolino, Angelis et al. 2007) , in the traditional sense of measurable network qualities like throughput or latency. (Shopov and Kakanakov 2007) provide an evaluation of the WS-Sec implementation of the Axis2 WS stack, but only consider the processing time and message size when using different WS-Sec features. In contrast, we focus on testing the interoperability of implementations of QoS features as provided by WS-* standards and security and reliability in particular. (Barbir, Hobbs et al. 2007 ) discuss challenges of testing Web Services and security in SOA environments. Interoperability is identified as a core requirement for testing service compositions, but an interoperability assessment of different WS-* implementations is not provided. Several approaches such as (Shetty and Vadivel 2009; Bertolino and Polini 2005) target at testing interoperability of Web Services, but do not consider WS-* based QoS features.
In the area of actually testing interoperability of WS-* based QoS features, the majority of approaches follows (Tsai, Zhou et al. 2008 ) in defining interoperability testing as "Conformance testing to ensure compliance with SOA protocols and standards". (Bhargavan, Fournet et al. 2005 ) describe a tool for statically validating WS-Sec-Pol configurations and (Nakamura, Sato et al. 2007 ) demonstrate how to use predicate logic to statically validate security policies. (Gruschka, Luttenberger et al. 2006 ) present an approach for checking SOAP messages for WS-Sec-Pol conformance at run-time. (Prennschütz-Schützenau, Mukhi et al. 2009 ) check conformance to the BSP statically and dynamically by inspecting SOAP messages. All these approaches analyze the configurations and message traffic of a single WS stack instance whereas we focus on the interaction of two WS stack instances of different solution providers. While we investigate whether or not communication can be completed successfully these approaches are able to check conformance to the WS-* specifications. In so far, these kind of approaches and our approach can be considered to complement each other. (Simon, László et al. 2010) present an interoperability assessment of SOA products with respect to WS-* standards for the Hungarian e-Government infrastructure. They evaluate only two security related test cases, but six SOA products and conclude that some products (including Metro/GlassFish) are mature for WS-* interoperability. The problems identified in the work at hand, however, reveal that much more thorough testing is needed. (Menzel, Warschofsky et al. 2010b ) provide a mature framework for testing, monitoring and analyzing Web Services that are secured via WS-Sec-Pol. While interoperability assessment across different stack vendors is out of scope, it may be useful for streamlining the interoperability assessment of more WS stacks as described in this work. Moreover, the patternbased approach for deriving WS-Sec-Pol configurations described in (Menzel, Warschofsky et al. 2010a ) may be used for deriving test cases that go beyond this work's test cases in providing application level features such as mutual authentication.
The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario has been analyzed by two different research groups (Backes, Mödersheim et al. 2006; Bhargavan, Corin et al. 2007 ). However, the focus of these projects was on formal analysis of security and reliability properties and not on policy-based realization. The original definition of the SecRM scenario stems from industry interoperability workshops and (Gavrylyuk, Hrebicek et al. 2005 ) provide a good description of the messages that are to be exchanged. However, the WS-Policy configurations for implementing the scenario are not given. One of the original authors of the SecRM scenario was asked for an updated version of the SecRM scenario that makes use of the latest WS-RM, WS-RM-Pol and WS-SecPol standards, but no updated version was available. Consistently, we were not able to discover an evaluation of the SecRM scenario support by WS stacks based on policy-based realization.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have thoroughly analyzed the interoperable implementation of WS-Sec-Pol/WS-RM-Pol by two major Java-based WS stacks. Our results show that Web Services developers cannot rely on interoperability of such WS-* features as provided by arbitrary WS stacks. While WS-I's work indisputably contributed to better Web Services interoperability, it apparently is not sufficient for guaranteeing interoperability of WS-Policy-driven QoS implementation. Using WS-Sec/WS-RM without WS-Policy however places unacceptable burdens on Web Services developers in requiring them to manually manipulate SOAP messages and agreeing on security mechanisms without predefined format. Functionality-wise we could prove that advanced realworld functionality can be implemented using WS-Sec-Pol and WS-RM-Pol. However, the choice of WS stack may severely influence availability and standards compliance of the solutions. Clearly, the identification of a broader range of advanced real-world usage scenarios is necessary to give practitioners a lever for deciding upon the use of WS-* or a particular WS-stack.
Future work therefore will focus on gathering more realistic use cases that justify the use of WS-* standards. Combined with the approach for systematically testing the basic functionality of WS-* standards, a comprehensive set of WS-Policy-based test cases shall be derived that can be used among WS stack vendors to assess cross-stack interoperability on the one hand and to ensure the availability of reasonable functionality on the other hand. Additionally, automated interoperability testing procedures are needed to streamline interoperability testing between various WS stacks in different versions.
